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In the midst of concerns about diminishing political support for human rights, 
individuals and groups across the globe continue to invoke them in their diverse 
struggles against oppression and injustice. Yet both those concerned with the 
future of human rights and those who champion rights activism as essential to 
resistance, assume that human rights -- as law, discourse and practices of rights 
claiming -- can ameliorate rightlessness. In questioning this assumption, the 
article seeks also to reconceptualise rightlessness by engaging with contemporary 
discussions of disposability and social abandonment in an attempt to be 
attentive to forms of rightlessness co-emergent with the operations of global 
capital. Developing a heuristic analytics of rightlessness, it evaluates the relatively 
recent attempts to mobilise human rights as a frame for analysis and action in 
the campaigns for justice following the 3 December 1984 gas leak from Union 
Carbide Corporation’s (UCC) pesticide manufacturing plant in Bhopal, Madhya 
Pradesh, India. Informed by the complex effects of human rights in the 
amelioration of rightlessness, the article calls for reconstituting human rights as 
an optics of rightlessness. 
 




1. The question concerning the relationship of human rights and rightlessness 
 
Despite grave concerns about the diminishing political support to fulfil and protect 
human rights across the globe, individuals and groups increasingly invoke human rights 
in their diverse struggles against oppression and injustice. Yet both those concerned with 
the future of human rights1 and those who champion rights activism as essential to 
resistance, 2  fail to question the relationship between human rights and human 
‘rightlessness’. Rather than theoretically explored and empirically examined, it is often 
assumed that human rights -- as law, discourse and practices of rights claiming 
constituted in a ‘symbiotic but tense relationship’3 – can ameliorate rightlessness.  
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A range of varied theorisations of human rights rely on this underlying 
assumption that human rights are addressed to, and can address, human rightlessness; 
that they are, in a certain sense, the antidote to rightlessness. This assumption holds for 
understandings of human rights as entitlements4 arising from morality or custom, which 
have historically informed rights struggles5 and which continue to enable the codification 
of human rights in international treaties and domestic constitutional-legal arrangements. 
For Charles Beitz this assumption transforms our understanding of rights from 
minimalist ‘natural’ rights accruing to all human beings by virtue of their nature to 
expansive and historically specific ‘basic requirements of global justice’ within the 
contemporary global economy.6 In political theory, Morton Winston argues that the 
amelioration of rightlessness is the very justification for human rights,7 while in sociology 
Bryan Turner advances a cosmopolitan conception of human rights aimed at the 
protection of a vulnerable humanity. 8  Critical theorisations of rights claiming as 
performative practice that can engender active citizens and revitalise democracy also 
share this assumption.9 For contemporary human rights scholarship, then, rightlessness is 
‘a transitional phenomenon that will be resolved with further entrenchment of human 
rights’.10 Strikingly, the assumption that rights are able to ameliorate rightlessness appears 
equally central to those rare accounts informed by the close interconnection of rights and 
rightlessness, such as Upendra Baxi’s, who forewarns that ‘narratives of human rights are 
inadequate, even misleading, without companion narratives of the production of human 
rightlessness’.11 In discussing the protection of human rights in India, Baxi attributes 
human rightlessness to ‘bare acts of sovereignty that simply refuses to accept certain 
claims to being human and having human rights in the first place’.12  
 What if, this article asks, the relationship between rights and rightlessness is not 
one of opposition -- of antidote to poison, or medicine to ailment? And, what if the 
conventional attribution of rightlessness to the state and its ‘acts of sovereignty’ is 
incomplete? Should we not consider amongst the contemporary sources of rightlessness 
the state’s legal attempts to address it and multinational capital’s treatment of people as 
disposable? Most worryingly, might processes of claiming and agitating for human rights 
occlude the persistence of rightlessness? Provoked by these questions, the article 
challenges the assumed opposition between rights and rightlessness, and seeks in the 
process to reconceptualise rightlessness itself beyond the simple denial of rights. 
Supplementing the historical association of rightlessness with statelessness, the article 
develops a heuristic analytics of rightlessness by engaging with contemporary discussions of 
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disposability and social abandonment. The analytics, it argues, enables us to ask how and 
to what extent the legal mobilisation and discursive invocation of human rights resists 
rightlessness understood in this heuristic manner. 
 The article, at the same time, seeks to ground such theoretical questioning of 
rightlessness, and its relationship to rights, in the relatively recent attempts to mobilise 
human rights as a frame for analysis and action in the campaigns for justice following the 
3 December 1984 gas leak from Union Carbide Corporation’s (UCC) pesticide 
manufacturing plant in Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, India.13 An estimated forty tonnes of 
highly toxic methyl isocyanate (MIC) and other gases leaked into the atmosphere, causing 
the deaths of at least 3,000 residents of the neighbourhoods [bastis] adjacent to the plant 
who could not outrun the toxic clouds. 14 Another estimated 20,000 residents have died 
in the three decades since, while half a million people – survivors and the next generation 
still residing in the vicinity of the abandoned and non-remediated factory -- continue to 
suffer from the health impacts of direct gas exposure and the worsening soil and ground-
water contamination.15 
 Widely acknowledged as the world’s gravest industrial catastrophe, and ‘the most 
significant recent example of United States industry injuring foreign victims’, 16  the 
Bhopal gas disaster has engendered diverse subjects, practices and continuously evolving 
modes of struggle in its campaigns for justice. Bhopal survivors, as their testimonies 
make clear, have ceaselessly struggled for ‘healthcare justice’,17 the improvement of work 
conditions, and for opportunities and pensions suitable for the little-understood needs of 
gas-affected residents.18 Whilst coping with the under-researched but no less debilitating 
effects of gas exposure,19 they have fought for justice.  Largely thwarted and unsuccessful 
legal attempts to hold UCC accountable for the leak and its devastation have been 
unfolding, initially led by the Union of India (UOI) in the US courts and later by the 
tenacious efforts of local activists who have fought to revive the case in the Bhopal 
courts, and whose efforts continue against Dow Chemical, which purchased UCC in 
2001 whilst repudiating all its liabilities in Bhopal.20 
 While the multiple forms of struggle and framings of the disaster are beyond the 
scope of this article, the analysis here examines the mobilisation of human rights in the 
last decade following the 20th anniversary of the gas leak, when NGOs such as Amnesty 
International, with elite reinforcement within India’s legal profession, began to frame the 
disaster and its aftermath as the ‘biggest example of human rights violation in the 
world’.21 Given the failure to bring UCC to justice through tort law, such interventions 
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appear to offer beneficial ways forward by making claims for justice within the legal 
frameworks and truth discourses of human rights, in which the state is the primary duty 
bearer. Employing the analytics of rightlessness it develops in section two, the article 
critically evaluates the extent to which turning to human rights law and discourse enables 
the amelioration of rightlessness in Bhopal in section three. Informed by the complex 
effects of human rights in the amelioration of rightlessness, the conclusion calls for 
reconstituting human rights as an optics of rightlessness.22 
2. Towards an analytics of rightlessness 
 
The contemporary plight of stateless populations, refugees, undocumented migrants or 
those seeking asylum from multiple forms of persecution ensures that discussions of 
rightlessness continue to relate it to the political community’s inability or unwillingness 
to fulfil the ‘right to have rights’,23 following Hannah Arendt’s articulations of this moral 
right ‘to belong to a political space’ that makes possible claims to subsequent 
constitutional rights and entitlements.24 Attributing rightlessness to statelessness endures 
in studies of the denial of rights to non-citizens or the emergence of human rights in 
place of those guaranteed by political community.25  
 In the context of human rights expansion and continued rights claiming in on-
going struggles against dispossession and oppression, this article calls for greater 
attention to forms of rightlessness co-emergent with the operations of global capital. The 
neoliberal governing economic paradigm -- enabled by discursive constructs ‘of a world 
governed by wise and efficient market forces, by invisible hands that effectively allocated 
profits and calibrated prices, wages…’ 26  -- has entailed ‘market-conforming state-
crafting’27 and has resulted in new legal-constitutional arrangements,28 which inflect in 
specific ways the pre-existing, colonial, forms of harm, abandonment and disposability, 
astutely captured by scholars of contemporary coloniality. 29 Seeking to expand our 
understanding of rightlessness is not a rejection of the importance of statelessness but, 
rather, a call to pluralise rightlessness’s meanings, locate its sources in the structural 
inequalities of market liberalisation and the very functioning of the law, and better 
recognise its many local sites. In this task, the article engages with recent discussions of 
‘social death’, ‘abandonment’ and, significantly, ‘disposability’ in order to articulate a 
heuristic analytics of rightlessness. 
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In linking rightlessness to contemporary forms of socio-economic exclusion and 
destitution, Lisa-Marie Cacho provides a compelling reading of neoliberal modes of 
differentiation and exclusion within the racialised imaginaries of US society, as 
exemplified in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, and in practices of countering 
terrorism and ‘illegal’ migration. While Cacho sustains the link between racialised 
rightlessness and the denial of ‘the right to have rights’ by/in a political community, her 
analyses of the ways in which ‘unprotectable’ citizens become criminalised by the state 
and its laws allow us to connect rightlessness to uses of the law to exclude historically 
specific, internal and external ‘others’ within political community. 30 This destitution 
through the law, then, forms the first element of our analytics of rightlessness. 
 Joao Biehl too charts the phenomenon of ‘social abandonment’ to neoliberal 
forms of governing, which individualise and differentiate according to groups’ and 
individuals’ productive value and, hence, negate the societal, communal and familial 
worlds of sociability within, amongst and towards ‘superfluous’ populations in Brazil. In 
addition to explicit neglect, Biehl shows abandonment to involve a host of medico-social 
interventions and other attempts at regularization by civil society, provincial and federal 
state agencies, which reinforce and enable the neglect of those considered superfluous. 31  
The idea that abandonment requires systematic ‘work’ recalls Veena Das’s insight that 
‘pain and suffering…are not simply individual experiences which arise out of the 
contingency of life’ but ‘may also be experiences which are actively created and 
distributed by the social order itself’.32 This active entrenchment of suffering by the social 
order forms the second element of an analytics of rightlessness. 
These scholarly interventions highlight the rendering of certain others as politically 
‘non-pertinent’ to the objectives articulated for the welfare and management of the 
population as a whole and, thus, as unworthy of ethical care.33  Such accounts make clear 
that modern governmental rationality has abandonment ‘always already inscribed into 
it’,34 making marginalisation and disposability ‘not only possible but ordinary’.35 What 
does it mean to be politically non-pertinent, however? With Cacho, we might trace non-
pertinence to processes of differentiation and exclusion within global, but locally 
manifested, modes of governing that render parts of the population ‘disposable’, in the 
sense of becoming ‘ineligible for personhood’.36  This form of ‘social death’ 
not only defines who does not matter, it also makes mattering meaningful. For 
different reasons, undocumented immigrants, the racialized poor of the global 
South, and criminalized U.S. residents of color in both inner cities and rural 
areas are populations who “never achieve, in the eyes of others, the status of 
‘living’”.37 
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Although the phrase ‘ineligibility for personhood’ highlights the complicity of the 
social order/political community in rendering segments of the population disposable, 
disaggregating the complex meanings of ‘disposability’ better informs our analysis of 
contemporary rightlessness. According to Ranjana Khanna, the adjective ‘disposable’ 
carries within it two distinct ‘references to excess’: in the sense of ‘disposable camera or 
disposable diaper,’ excess denotes any such thing that is intended for a limited number or 
period of use ‘at which point it is treated as excessive or as waste matter’.38  This ‘greater 
unity of production, consumption, and excretion’ signals that ‘the disposability of 
workers’ is not just an ideological construct but, rather, constitutive of capitalist social 
relations.39 In another sense, ‘disposable’ refers to one’s ‘disposable income or disposable 
assets’, which denotes ‘something…in excess of notions such as need, necessity, or 
requirement’.40 Both senses of ‘limited use, then waste’ and ‘in excess of necessity’ are 
predicated on the disposable object or subject being available for use. 41 The capturing of 
human beings as a (disposable) available resource [Bestand], explored by Martin Heidegger 
as an epochal transformation specific to modernity’s objectifying forms of relationality,42 
forms the third element of our analytic of rightlessness.  
The verb ‘to dispose’ too denotes excess but, upon reflection, also bears strong 
connections to governing and the sovereign exercise of power. To ‘dis-pose’ recalls ‘…a 
laying down of something…a disposition suggesting…a suitable placing and enframing 
of things and words’.43 Placing and arranging the available (and disposable) subjects 
invokes Foucault’s understanding of ‘government’ as a form of directing and regulating 
conduct focused on discerning and effecting the ‘right disposition of things’ to achieve 
socio-economic objectives, rather than as restricted to apparati of the state.44 Articulating 
objectives about the population entails distinguishing between the pertinent and the non-
pertinent, expendable, parts of the population. At the same time, ‘to dis-pose’ highlights 
‘an exertion of power by the disposer…in a decision to exercise a control’; this is best 
understood in the ‘sovereign commandment’ which decides on the specific disposition 
(arranging, use) and disposal (use, ‘discarding of’) of the available-disposable.45 This two-
fold exercise of governmental and sovereign power for organizing and enabling 
disposability forms the fourth element in our analytics of rightlessness.  
 Formulating an analytics around questions of legal exclusion, facilitation of 
suffering by the social order itself, the capturing of people as disposable resources and 
the exercise of power in the enablement of disposability acknowledges, at a minimum, 
that rightlessness far exceeds the tragedies of statelessness. Importantly, it highlights the 
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‘international’ processes of becoming- and keeping-rightless in the contemporary ‘life-
times of disposability’. 46  Rather than assume that human rights are able to rectify 
rightlessness, the analytics encourages a more sober assessment of the possibilities for 
amelioration through human rights, which the remainder of the article examines in the 
complex turn to human rights in the Bhopal campaigns for justice.  
3. Grounding rightlessness in the multiple Bhopal disasters 
 
Offering a necessarily fragmentary discussion of the turn to human rights law and 
discourse in campaigns for justice in Bhopal, this section mobilises the elements of the 
analytics of rightlessness developed above in order to evaluate the potential contributions 
and risks of human rights’ ability to resist rightlessness. 
 
3.1 Contest ing the l egal  product ion o f  r ight l essness  
 
Reflecting on the incontestable failure of the law, and litigation as a strategy for obtaining 
justice for the Bhopal survivors, the former Chief Justice of India J.S. Verma called 
Bhopal ‘an egregious violation of human rights of thousands of people’.47 Preceding this 
influential pronouncement, an investigative report by Amnesty International had also 
called Bhopal – the gas leak and its legal and political aftermath – ‘a human tragedy and a 
tragedy for human rights’ at its twentieth anniversary in 2004.48 Indeed, in the case of 
Bhopal, the ‘law’ – legislation, litigation, legal doctrine and processes of adjudication – 
played a central role in entrenching rightlessness in the heuristic sense explored above. 
The Bhopal Act of 1985 designating the UOI as the sole legal representative of the 
Bhopal gas-affected population, the adversarial legal framing of the disaster which de-
prioritised much-needed compensation of survivors, 49  the failed attempts to legally 
pursue UCC in the US courts,50 the 1989 Indian Supreme Court settlement now viewed 
as a ‘miscarriage of justice’,51 as well as the continuing, obstacle-ridden, efforts to bring 
UCC to justice in the Madhya Pradesh courts in the decades since,52 have all received 
critical attention, leading scholars, including those involved in the various attempts to 
obtain justice, to speak of ‘legal torpor’.53 Two striking, rather than exhaustive, examples 
illuminate the forms of rightlessness perpetuated though the law.  
Bridget Hanna’s ethnography maps the closure of participation, indeed, the 
exclusion from the legal struggle for justice, following the Bhopal Act (1985), which 
adopted the parens patriae principle in order to enable the state ‘to pursue mass disaster 
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litigation as a victim surrogate before US judicial fora’.54 In one sense, invoking parens 
patriae was technical decision that allowed India to pursue UCC, which would otherwise 
have been outside its jurisdiction. Moreover, it morally recognized that ‘most of the gas 
victims did not have the resources or even the language (in this case, English) necessary 
to fight the legal battle for themselves’ and was hence intended to officially represent and 
protect the Bhopal survivors.55 India’s legal response to the disaster, however, cast 
survivors as ‘“juridically incompetent”, a status usually reserved for the very young or the 
mentally ill’, which inadvertently ‘robbed them of their legal right to pursue Union 
Carbide individually while technically establishing their right to be provided for, and 
advocated for, by the government’. 56  Hence, in legislating for their protection, 
representation and provision of care, the state rendered Bhopal survivors voiceless in 
legal fora and processes of justice: ‘the government’s rhetorical monopolization of the 
poverty and acute suffering of the survivors became a way to limit their rights by 
declaring them non sui juris (without the legal capacity to act for themselves)’.57 As Sheela 
Thakur explains ‘we felt like beggars on the street. We forgot we were asking for our 
rights as citizen’s [sic] of a free country’. 58 
 A second example, drawn from the administrative procedures for adjudicating 
the thousands of compensation claims following the 1989 Settlement, also illustrates the 
perpetuation of legal exclusion and destitution. The procedures established about who 
could apply for, and receive, compensation required stringent documentation of deaths 
and injuries. Because ‘the government has legitimized only the documented and 
registered individual deaths, a process which required autopsy and registration with the 
police’,59 many survivors were prohibited from being able to claim even the negligible 
sums of compensation for lives lost ($2,000) and for injuries ($500). Many impoverished 
residents of the areas adjoining the pesticide factory were recent internal migrants to 
Bhopal or itinerant, not ‘carrying identifying documents…and would not have been 
accounted for in a census’.60 Moreover, the immediate decisions of the Madhya Pradesh 
and federal authorities to cremate or bury victims en masse, with the Indian Army 
transporting bodies to forests and rivers as far as the Narmada, left survivors and families 
of those who perished without the necessary death registration documents required for 
claiming compensation.61  
 And yet the law remains the site in which local and international activists 
continue to locate the possibility of attributing responsibility for the disaster, obtaining 
meaningful reparations, and ensuring remediation of the life-threatening environmental 
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conditions caused by the operation and abandonment of the plant.62 NGO and activist 
appeals to human rights as a more progressive and universal legal framework appear to 
offer renewed possibilities for framing the disaster, ameliorating rightlessness and 
achieving justice in Bhopal. How do human rights contest the exclusions and 
deprivations created in the legal responses and procedural arrangements to the disaster, 
as articulated in the first element of our analytics of rightlessness?  
Two arguments have been put forward in this regard. The first proposes human 
rights as a moral and practical yardstick for judging the integrity of the domestic legal 
system. International human rights frameworks provide a way to assess state 
commitment to human rights through intergovernmental mechanisms such as the 
Universal Periodic Review or by exerting pressure and encouraging enhanced 
enforcement and improvements to constitutions and National Human Rights 
Institutions.63  In much the same vein, human rights arguably can provide a standard for 
evaluating the integrity and responsibility of the domestic legal response to Bhopal in 
light of the continued injustices suffered by survivors. Justice Verma urged, for instance, 
that India’s state and legal profession must ask, ‘what were the remedies to which they 
[Bhopalis] were entitled at the time of the disaster and identify the violation of human 
rights’.64 As a site and a framework for assessing the impact of local, legal arrangements 
on the entrenchment of rightlessness, human rights reopen these forms of exclusion to 
reconsideration and demand, if not always ensure, their reform. 
A second argument proposes human rights law as a better alternative to tort law, 
which has served as the traditional legal avenue for pursuing justice against corporations,  
specifically the law of ‘negligence’ or ‘delict’, the fundamental objectives of 
which are to (i) provide a level of compensation to a victim which as much as 
possible reinstates the victim in the position that he or she would have been in if 
the negligence had not occurred and (ii) act as a deterrent against future 
wrongdoing by the perpetrator and others generally.65 
 
As noted above, redress through tort law was pursued by the Indian state in the US 
courts but was thwarted when the Second District Court of New York accepted UCC’s 
forum non conveniens claims regarding the ‘availability of an adequate alternative forum’ in 
India.66  
 Patently preferable to tort litigation which, in the case of mass chemical disasters, 
tends to become ‘trapped in a legal paralysis and conceptual vacuum’,67 scholars have 
also argued that human rights law offers a higher normative standard compared to tort 
law. The latter reduces the ‘significance of the alleged misconduct and harm’ because it 
focuses on, and articulates charges in terms of, negligence.68 On the contrary, Ratna 
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Kapur claims with Bhopal disaster in mind, human rights facilitate more ‘systemic’ 
interventions because they stand at a distance from the market ethos. Human rights law 
and discourse do not accept, as tort law does, a certain level of risk to human life within 
economic activity, which renders tort law ‘ill-equipped to deal with mass disasters 
resulting from ultrahazardous activities’69 of MNCs with grave potential to cause serious 
human harm, especially in developing countries where ‘regulatory arbitrage’70 incentivises 
corporations to ‘export [of] hazard’71  through inferior factory design and lax operational 
standards of worker and public protection. This is a case in point in Bhopal where ‘the 
technological preconditions for a major accident were embedded in the design of the 
Bhopal plant, which allowed for bulk storage of MIC in large, underground tanks in an 
environment that used manual noncomputerized control systems’.72Moreover, again 
unlike tort law, human rights escape the ‘market model’ based on an ‘ethic of economic 
efficiency’, which renders judgements based on tort law as ‘mere palliatives’, however 
significant to those seeking justice.73 This potentiality of human rights for meaningful 
‘systemic’ interventions, however, requires first a perspectival shift away from having to 
prove intentionality for violations towards accepting impact assessment of the harm caused; 
and second, that the right to life, on which impact will be assessed, be grasped within 
broader economic and social conditions rather than in the ‘more restrictive interpretation 
accorded to the right in the American context’.74 
Both arguments for the ability of human rights to contest the perpetuation of 
rightlessness through the law come up against long-discussed limits of human rights as 
well as recent trends in their evolution and embedding that constraint their effectiveness. 
A brief recounting illuminates how these concerns inflect the turn to human rights in 
Bhopal. First, the limited justiciability arising from the progressive realisation of 
economic and social rights delimits their ability to act as an evaluative yardstick for the 
legal response to the disaster;75 it also problematizes a systemic assessment of MNC 
practices based on the right to life fully embedded within its economic and social 
dimensions as advocated by Kapur. Second, the ‘complex concert’ between states in need 
of investment and technological innovation and MNCs, which characterised India’s 
relationship with UCC and later with Dow Chemical, has arguably weakened states’ 
ability to uphold human rights.76 Third, and related, the development of a ‘new global 
regime of economic rights’ of multinational capital in the emerging neoliberal 
constitutionalism not only obstructs, but regresses, the embedding of global human 
rights and its ability to contest the market model.77 
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3.2 Indic t ing the fac i l i tat ion o f  suf f er ing by the soc ia l  order  
 
The moral superiority of human rights is also implicitly invoked in the castigation of the 
social order – state and society -- for its permissive and active role in creating and 
entrenching suffering in Bhopal. How and to what extent do human rights enable an 
indictment of the social order in the second element of the analytics? 
The continued centrality of the state as the primary duty bearer within human 
rights discourses and law illuminates, not only corporate crime and negligence, but the 
Indian state’s grave responsibility for creating and failing to alleviate survivors’ suffering. 
The complicity of the state before the disaster centres on its laxity in regulating 
appropriate design and safe operational practices by UCC in its search for foreign direct 
investments and technology transfers. The significance of technologically advanced 
industrialisation was articulated as early as 1948 and created a permissive environment78 
in which UCC designed and operated the Bhopal plant: ‘the Indian government 
repeatedly violated it’s own laws — from FERA [Foreign Exchange Regulation Act], to 
zoning restrictions, to ensuring comparable safety standards — in their dealings with 
UCC’.79 Both the national and state authorities ignored explicit warnings raised by plant 
workers, local citizens, and journalists like Rajkumar Keswani, who repeatedly raised the 
alarm about the dangers posed by UCIL’s factory in articles in Rapat Weekly as early as 
1981. 80  Design and operational failures in the MIC unit leading to the death of 
Mohammed Ashraf in 1981 and a substantial fire in ‘the alpha-naphthol unit in 1982’, 
also failed to convince the authorities to take ‘any regulatory action’.81 Far from heeding 
such signs, local ‘politicians looking for votes happily granted pattas [rights to the land] to 
illegal residents next to the factory, never informing them that it posed an immense 
hazard’.82  
In addition to the state, authoritative institutions of society, such as the law and 
medicine failed to provide relief, remediation, health and justice to the survivors of 
Bhopal, further entrenching their rightlessness.  While what Bhopal ‘was asking for was 
an innovative and radical bureaucracy’83 the ‘scientific, legal and administrative structures 
of modern society’ in India, including those professions and institutions charged with 
survivors’ care, masked ‘from the powerless the manner in which their suffering may 
have been manufactured and distributed by an unjust society’, shifting responsibility 
from themselves to the gas-affected residents. 84  At the same time, discourses of 
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development in India fixated on ‘the slum as pathology and excess’,85 renewing forms of 
repression in the name of law and order and translating the rights of survivors 
rearticulated in the Bhopal Act as charity towards the ‘undeserving poor’.86  
How can a social order ‘allow such a disposal of the other, without indicting 
itself’87 and how might rights problematize the legitimacy of social institutions and 
attitudes, and disrupt collective modes of ethico-political negligence that lead to 
disposability and rightlessness? Can human rights, this article asks, function as an ‘optics’, 
a sort of mirror through which the social order takes a hard look at its own processes of 
sustaining rightlessness? Stories and life narratives play an important role in this 
potentiality of human rights as an optics of rightlessness. Richard Rorty, for example, 
long held the view that sentimental education of publics through stories of suffering 
were more likely to succeed in reforming social institutions and attitudes at home and 
abroad than condescending judgements of societies’ irrationality or backwardness.88 In 
Bhopal, projects of collecting and reflecting on survivor-activists’ oral histories aimed to 
generate discussion on future themes and directions of the movements89 but may also 
function as an optics that ‘disrupts the normal flow of social life’ while at the same time 
‘creat[ing] windows on normality’ that reveal the ‘political and social processes’ of 
rightlessness:90 ‘Bhopal reveals the truth of the system as it has revealed it to me’, says a 
Bhopali activist. 91  Finally, personal narrations of human rights abuses are seen as 
positively enhancing ‘public mobilisations of concern’ and enabling narrators to 
transcend their private worlds of suffering to speak out as political subjects against 
injustice.92  In other words, this not only facilitates the castigation of the social order but 
also works to resubjectivise those constructed as disposable resources by state, society 
and capital, as we explore below in the third element of the analytics. 
 
3.3 Contes t ing construct ions o f  c i t izens as disposable  resources  through 
resubjec t iv i sat ion 
 
Analyses of the subjectivising effects of human rights discourses and practices of rights 
claiming investigate the ways in which human rights contest the subjectification of 
disposable subjects by state, society and capital, aiding them in challenging, and to some 
extent ‘unworking’, their voicelessness within the law, the active creation of their 
suffering within the social order and their constructed disposability. Truth discourses of 
human rights convey the ‘“vital” character of living human beings’ as articulated by ‘an 
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array of authorities considered competent to speak that truth’.93 They identify human 
rights-bearers as subjects of equal moral worth and dignity, and as such enable those 
deemed disposable by the social order to work to recover new ways to be. In other 
words, human rights discursively intervene in the everyday suffering of Bhopal survivors 
and rearticulate this ‘accidental and unfortunate’ suffering into both morally abhorrent 
and politically actionable grievances. Human rights allow Bhopal survivors -- as 
legitimate political subjects of grievance with identifiable paths for attributing 
responsibility to duty bearers for rights protection, namely, states, -- to make demands of 
the state in a register that is audible internationally.  
Moreover, this political subject is also a legal subject, whose rights states have 
undertaken to protect and guarantee through ratification of international covenants.94 
Importantly for Bhopal survivors, human rights claiming practices reawaken a subject of 
entitlement within a subject constituted by its very lack: of fulfilled rights, of healthcare 
justice, of value. Emphasising the entitlement of human beings predicated on the moral 
value of human life aims to resist the devaluation of some life, best captured by the retort 
of a Dow Chemical spokesman’s to US activists fasting in solidarity with Bhopal 
survivors: ‘$500 plenty for an Indian’.95 Hence, discourses of human rights and practices 
of rights claiming remind the international and domestic social order that ‘…life that no 
longer has any value for society is hardly synonymous with a life that no longer has any 
value for the person living it’.96  
 Acknowledging the potentiality of countering the subjectivisation of Bhopalis as 
disposable cannot ignore the complex relationship of rights to power, which raises 
important concerns. First, local mobilisations of rights are understood to rearticulate 
local suffering into globally audible articulations of rights claims and it is this 
internalisation of rights that resubjectivises them as dissenting subjects.97 At the heart of 
such local mobilisations productive of rights-holding subjectivities, however, remains a 
kernel of the liberal autonomous individual – the ontological assumptions of a morally 
equal, dignified and autonomous rights-holder.98 This raises the concern, among others, 
that assuming moral worthiness and dignity as innate, risks occluding both the systematic 
processes of rendering people disposable that entrench rightlessness 99 and also their pre-
existing struggles for justice. 
Second, and related, assuming a legally entitled subject of rights may similarly 
obscure that what is needed to make this entitlement concrete and to disrupt the 
expendability of Bhopal survivors is the pluralisation and intensification, through rights, 
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of their long-standing and multifarious struggle for justice and everyday subsistence, 
health, and environmental safety. Put otherwise, assuming rights as the legal solution, 
views human rights as a ‘practice, in which politics is understood as law’, a conception 
that risks ‘beguiling socially disadvantaged groups with the false promise of a legal 
remedy for their grievances, if only they articulate them as rights’,100 and may be in 
tension with local visions of rights inextricable from struggles for social and distributive 
justice.101 In part, this risk hinges on the extent to which subjectivisation emerges from, 
and further shapes, locally grounded mobilisations of rights for struggle, in the absence 
of which, reframing local problems through rights may ‘displace alternative visions of 
social justice that are less individualistic and more focused on communities and 
responsibilities’.102 This questions whether elite and NGO analyses of Bhopal in terms of 
human rights work to displace or support preexisting local visions and paths of justice, 
although the two are not mutually exclusive. 
A third, and again related, concern surrounds the impact of privileging 
adjudicatory and litigation processes of human rights as a site for activism.103 The 
location of human rights in such processes potentially narrows ‘what types of action may 
be imagined’ by Bhopal activists.104 In other words, in providing the ‘infrastructural’ and 
discursive parameters in which survivors may resist or strategic litigation may be pursued, 
human rights tends to reduce problems into rights violations and, partly, constrains and 
channels subjects’ practices of dissent through the law.105  
Finally, returning to the liberal subject of rights, does the compatibility of human 
rights law, ‘particularly that part that emphasizes civil and political rights,’ and at least the 
partial coherence of rights-holding subjectivities with neoliberalism, weaken the radical 
contestations of lived experiences of disposability which human rights are able to 
engender?106 Yet, as scholars have argued, when social movements mobilise human rights 
for social justice and against diverse operations of power they refute this compatibility.107 
In the context of Bhopal, the struggle ‘makes demands of the law, but also it calls for 
something more – something that is difficult to articulate’ which is a questioning of the 
histories of disposability against the poorest citizens by state, society and capital.108 
 
3.4 Chal lenging the exerc ise  o f  power  
 
The final element of the analytics of rightlessness focuses on the ways in which human 
rights challenge the operations of governmental and sovereign power. Taking the latter 
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first, the state-centred mechanisms of attribution of responsibility for violations are both 
a drawback and a strength of the international human rights regime. In Bhopal, where 
direct attribution and redress for human rights abuses against corporations remains an 
aspiration,109 the human rights legal framework determines ‘what [state] obligations under 
international law have been breached and what protective standards failed’. 110  The 
mechanisms of attributing responsibility to states, and the symbolic castigation that this 
enables, are especially significant for the campaigns for justice in Bhopal, where the state 
failed to regulate UCC’s operations and to protect the lives and health of citizens.  
Indeed, the broader difficulties with pursuing private actors directly for violations 
have led to the reassertion of state attribution mechanisms in the recent United Nations 
‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework, which articulates a strong duty for states to 
protect human rights and pursue corporations in the event of violations by business.111 
Emphasising state attribution in the invocation of human rights in Bhopal appears to 
have cemented existing local critiques of the Indian state amongst activists: ‘My priority 
at that time was to punish the offenders and get compensation. Now I would also put 
more emphasis on the Government because it is as much their fault that all this has 
come this far. It is the Government’s responsibility if they permit such factories…’112 
Nevertheless, serious concerns question the faith placed on the state-centred 
mechanisms of attribution. Significantly, the state centric vocabularies of human rights 
fail to grasp the ‘state like but non-state’ agency of multinational corporations.113 Human 
rights organisations increasingly recognise this and have long urged creating direct 
mechanisms for attribution for corporations.114 Moreover, the state-centricity of human 
rights frameworks may render them blind to the diffusion of corporate material and 
normative power within state institutions and bureaucracies, brought about by neoliberal 
socio-economic reforms and a broader ‘generalisation of the economic form of the 
market’ across many social domains, which sets market truth as the yardstick by which to 
judge policy and bureaucratic activity.115 Moreover, rights may fail to grasp and to 
respond to the ways in which neoliberalising states are becoming hybridised with 
exigencies and interests of business.116 Post-independence India’s ‘fear of exploitation’ 
gradually transformed into a fear of ‘exclusion’ from the international order, affecting the 
state’s perceptions of its need and search for multinational capital, technology and 
international legitimation.117  
Relatedly, human rights obligations for business remain voluntary. The UN 
‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework articulates a responsibility, rather than a legal 
	   16 
duty, for business to ‘avoid infringing on the human rights of others…’ 118  Such 
voluntariness relax the ethical obligations of corporations, and do little to pierce the 
‘corporate veil’, permitting multinationals like Dow Chemical to denounce responsibility 
for the liabilities of subsidiaries, as in its 2001 acquisition of UCC.119 This assertion of the 
corporate veil enables Dow Chemical to maintain that ‘efforts to directly involve [Dow] 
in legal proceedings in India concerning the 1984 Bhopal tragedy are without merit’, 
which it recently claimed in response to a third summons to present UCC to the courts 
issued by the Chief Judicial Magistrate of Bhopal in August 2014.120 In other words, 
human rights’ state-centric attribution and voluntary standards for corporate conduct fail 
to challenge the practices of multinational capital to evade responsibility for the extreme 
human suffering it produces.  
 In terms of contesting governmental power, it is hoped that human rights can 
help us see ‘individual biographies of human and social suffering’ and convert them ‘into 
social texts problematizing governance’.121 Does problematizing governing by translating 
the suffering of Bhopal survivors into human rights violations, however, not at the same 
time colonise that suffering, potentially leading to the emergence of a ‘human rights 
governmentality’ which articulates objectives, collates data, monitors observance and 
governs the conduct of states and citizens?122  Much like the ‘imperial techniques of 
emergent green governmentality’ in India after Bhopal, which aimed to operationalize the 
‘lessons of Bhopal’ for safety improvements in industrial activity, a human rights 
governmentality too may ‘construct a future regime of law reform…in a parasitical 
relation to’ and doing ‘little to ameliorate the plight of the Bhopal-violated’.123  
4. Conclusion: from amelioration to an optics for rightlessness? 
 
This article questioned the assumption that human rights -- as law, discourse and 
practices of rights claiming – can ameliorate rightlessness. Developing a heuristic 
analytics of rightlessness as intimately connected to processes of abandonment and 
disposability, it examined in the context of the campaigns for justice in Bhopal the 
potential and risks of pursuing the amelioration of rightlessness, understood heuristically, 
through human rights. The concerns with human rights’ mobilisation and the excessive 
focus on amelioration itself leads us to shift our hopes for human rights towards their 
potentiality to act as an optics of rightlessness that reveal the processes through which 
the law, the social order, state power and modern governmental rationalities entrench 
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rightlessness as disposability. Rather than assuring a transitional path away from 
rightlessness, rights as an optics of rightlessness illuminate, and potentially disrupt, the 
practices of state, society and capital that treat humans as potential waste after use, 
transforming availability into disposability. This potential of rights to disclose the 
entrenchment of rightlessness emerged in each of the analyses above: as an optics of the 
domestic legal system’s and international tort law’s responsibility for the injustices 
perpetuated on the Bhopal survivors since 1984; as an optics of the role of the social 
order in the processes of keeping-rightless those people it regards and treats as waste and 
in ‘excess of necessity’; and as disclosure of the potentiality of aiding survivorsown 
contestation of these disposable subjectivities; and as a view into the work abandonment 
by sovereign and governmental power. Mirroring Das’s hope for the anthropological 
gaze, might we reconstitute human rights as an optics -- ‘forming one body, providing 
voice, and touching victims, so that their pain may be experienced in other bodies as 
well’124 -- as yet one other means for Bhopal survivors to teach us what struggle against 
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